Viticulture has an effect on several ecosystem services, while it also is a sector critically affected by diverse ecological risks. Payments for agri-environmental services address several of these risks. Based on 77 interviews, we compare the motivational patterns of vintners participating and non-participating in the Austrian agri-environmental scheme ÖPUL to analyse mechanisms of motivation crowding. We identified three types of vintners that are motivated not only by "financial incentives" but also by a complex combination of different intersecting socio-psychological mechanisms -such as frame shifting by social learning or peer recognition reinforcing or control aversion and frustration with the administrative burden hindering the delivery of environmental services. More research is needed to understand how different strategies of risk governance, such as legal standards, information, capacity building, incentives and reflective discourse might be best combined to address different groups of farmers.
Introduction
Agriculture has an impact on a wide range of ecosystem services and climate change, while it is also considered as the economic sector most affected by climate change and natural disasters Conditional payments such as agri-environmental schemes (AES) and other payments for ecosystem services have been providing monetary incentives for land users to adopt more environmental friendly practises, to improve the environmental quality and to combat ecological risks in the EU since the late 1980s (European Commission, s.a.). Complementing legal restrictions, education and awareness raising, zoning and other policies constitute an important component of a bundle of diverse risk governance strategies. The Austrian AES (Austrian program for an environmental friendly agriculture -ÖPUL) has been implemented since 1995. It is one example of a European AES covering objectives such as the promotion of land use and farming practises that improve the environmental quality, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, maintain landscape quality and the implementation of environmental and nature conservation policies on the national and the provincial level (BMLFUW, 2016).
Viticulture has also been targeted by ÖPUL responding to increased carbon emissions and climate change (e.g. Longbottom Financial incentives, as external motivations, however interact with other motivational drivers, such as values, norms, worldviews, informal institutions or social expectations. Thus, we can see motivation crowding (crowding in of farmers not intrinsically motivated to contribute to conservation, crowding out of farmers' intrinsic motivations for conservation) within the spectrum of intrinsic (for example, values, social expectations) and extrinsic (for example, cash incentives, auctions) motivations (Deci, 1971; Deci et al., 1999) . A vivid academic debate is emerging around the question to which degree external incentives are crowding out intrinsic motivations for pro-environmental behaviour (Evans et , inquiries for agricultural speciality crops such as wine are still missing. Therefore, the focus of this paper is twofold: (1) we compared the motivation and actual practises of vintners that are participating in the ÖPUL scheme with non-participants, and (2) we investigated indications for crowding in and crowding out effects among a group of vintners participating in the ÖPUL programme between 2007-2013. Specifically, we want to use and test the applicability of the framework by Rode et al. (2015) to better understand crowding-out and crowding-in effects of payments for AES in vineyards.
Theoretical background on motivation crowding

Motivations for scheme participation and the contested role of financial incentives for service delivery
Budgets, some say, are policies in figures. In this sense, rising public payments for environmental services demonstrate the increasing importance of environmental concerns in EU agricultural policy (Ingram et al., 2013; OECD, 2016) . In agricultural contexts, conditional, direct payments are generally considered efficient and effective (Wunder, 2015 Engel (2016) provided a comprehensive discussion of different AES and PES policy designs, building on the criticism (1) that there is mixed evidence under which conditions financial payments are successful in terms of service delivery and that they are no panacea and (2) that many studies do not find any motivation crowding effects and in general lack rigour (see also Rode et al., 2015) . Financial incentives for the delivery of environmental services usually are not based on the result, i.e. the provision of the environmental service itself (for example, decrease in erosion). They are rather based on the delivery of particular practises, which are considered as beneficial (for example, greening of vineyards at certain periods of the year, which is considered as helpful to reduce erosion), usually with limited evidence on the effectiveness of these practices (Engel, 2016) .
Contract types have been discussed from different perspectives: farmers consider longer contract durations as risky because they are lowering their flexibility to adapt to future market 358/xx fluctuations and other changes and therefore expect higher payments (Ruto & Garrod, 2009 
Crowding-out mechanisms
Rode et al. (2015) identified different mechanisms triggering crowding-out effects: reduced intrinsic motivation through the introduction of financial incentives, aversion to change and control as well as frustration (see Table 1 ). As already mentioned above, the introduction of financial incentives might lower intrinsic motivation for service delivery, the self-esteem and the ‚feel good' effect of delivering a value that has previously been recognised by a peer group or by society with non-monetary rewards. The presence of the payment scheme makes it more difficult to distinguish if ecological services are delivered voluntarily (for example on moral grounds) or for economic reasons. Goodin (1994) 
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Tab 1. Crowding-out mechanisms (Rode et al., 2015) .
Crowding-in mechanisms
The current debate on motivation crowding builds on concepts such as self-determination (for emphasised the role of identity for the intention to participate in activities that are more labour-and time-consuming than the regular activity. Inter-subjective recognition is crucial for the successful formation of self-identity and group recognition (Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Honneth, 1992) . Thus, for understanding farmers' attitude towards nature or pro-environmental practises, it is important to comprehend the more general norms and values that are conditioning their integration into and social recognition of the particular peer group (Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Honneth, 1992) . Agricultural production and the delivery of ecological services are directly linked to norms, which define favourable or at least acceptable practices. Monetary recognition systems such as AES and PES are also redistributing resources for the delivery of such services. The positive reinforcement of societally valued services and social recognition results in increased self-esteem, which is discussed as an important driver for crowding in. Various scholars however also stress the importance of peer and social groups for the delivery of ecological services or group-based payment schemes (Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 2010; Van Hecken et al., 2017). PES and AES are also symbolic signals that delivering environmental services is valued by outsiders and society (Frey, 1992) and they are expected to improve the general attitude towards ecological quality, environmentally friendly management practises and the regulating institutional design (Sommerville et al., 2010) . Overall, the academic debate on intrinsic motivation and crowding-in is diverse, sometimes inconclusive and less researched than crowding out (Rode et al., 2015 
Reduced image motivation
Incentives undermine the individual's desire to present oneself as a "good person" ("signalling") since others can no longer distinguish if one undertakes a social activity voluntarily or due to external incentives.
Release from moral reasonability
Compensating for environmental harm via monetary payments releases people from feelings of responsibility and guilt. 6. Frame shifting An individual's attention is shifted towards a focus on economic reasoning (short term).
Changes in values of mindsets
The focus on economic reasoning affects attitudes and mindsets regarding conservation (long-term).
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Tab 2. Crowding-in mechanisms (Rode et al., 2015) .
ÖPUL measures and the environmental quality of vineyards
In 2014 (data of this article were collected between 2012-2014), 7,177 or 84% of all vintners participated in at least one ÖPUL measure. In this section, we present these ÖPUL measures, which are also the object of our empirical analysis.
Erosion control
Through a vegetation cover or the application of grass, bark mulch or straw in the vine rows, erosion control should help to protect the soil against wind and water erosion and to reduce the loss of nutrients into the surface water (BMLFUW, 2013). With an inclination of ≥ 25% the vegetation cover has to be yearlong and is subsidized, depending on the slope gradient, with 300-800 €/hectare. On slopes < 25%, it can be kept also just from 1 st November until 30 th April (125 €/hectare). Terraces are regarded per se as erosion control and can be kept open (BMLFUW, 2013). Spontaneous vegetation ("natural greening" in contrast to "seeding") was only allowed as erosion control in ÖPUL 2007-2013.
Organic farming
The goal of organic management is the promotion of sustainable management practices and includes a ban of synthetic pesticides and mineral fertilizers in order to protect biodiversity and natural resources (BMLFUW, 2013). Eligibility criteria for the subsidy (750 €/hectare) include inter alia the official certification with an organic auditing body and the maintenance of landscape elements (BMLFUW, 2013). 
Integrated production (IP)
IP
Areas of high nature value
This measure should help to maintain areas and structures that are of high value for nature conservation (BMLFUW, 2013). In viticulture, it is mainly relevant for the management of The mitigation of soil erosion is mainly due to the mechanical protection by the vegetation cover; it is therefore of utmost importance to establish a fully developed vegetation cover at summer when heaviest rainfall events could cause huge erosion (Lieskovský & Kenderessy, 2014) . The current ÖPUL erosion mitigation measure was frequently criticised by the vintners for not being adequate to reduce soil erosion as at the earliest date for soil tillage (1 st May) -in many cases -it was too late to re-establish vegetation cover in vineyard inter-rows before heavy summer rainfalls. 
Material and methods
Case study sites
The study took place in the three Austrian winegrowing regions Wachau, Wagram and Leithaberg-Neusiedlersee (and mainly there in the municipalities Purbach am Neusiedlersee, Grossriedenthal and Dürnstein). The case study selection followed two criteria: (1) the representation of the two largest wine producing Provinces (Lower Austria, Burgenland) and (2) already existing contacts and established relationships to local representatives of the winegrowing communities, different actors and stakeholders, so that trust was already built up for the interviews and a follow-up workshop with all participants, scientists and politicians.
The Wachau (Wu) is a ~36 km long valley on both sides of the river Danube, located around 80 km North-West from Vienna, between the cities Melk and Krems. In it, one of the most renowned Austrian winegrowing regions is situated. Six of the 13 municipalities of the Wachau form the "wine-region Wachau" holding a viticulture area of around 1.350 hectares (ÖWM, s.a.a), managed by about 600 vintners (Feigl & Peyerl, 2011) . Mainly due to its unique and highly aesthetical dry-stone walls, the Wachau was designated with the European Diploma for The winegrowing region Leithaberg-Neusiedlersee (LN) (3,576 hectares, see Bauer et al., 2013) is located around 60 km South-East of Vienna on the west side of the lake Neusiedlersee. It stretches from a quite plain terrain to the rolling hills of the Leithagebirge. The winegrowing region, which partly belongs to the UNESCO World Heritage Site "Ferto/Neusiedler See Cultural Landscape", also include Natura 2000 areas and nature parks. In contrast to the other two study sites, there are no terraces.
Data and methods
The data was collected in an interdisciplinary research project on phytodiversity and viticulture from 2012-2014 (Kieninger & Winter, 2014 ) linking social science with ecological research. In this article, we present the results from the social science part, focussing on vintner's motivations for (non-) participation in the ÖPUL programme, in order to identify crowding-in and crowding-out effects.
For the research project, literature-based semi-structured interview guidelines were developed and fine-tuned after the first set of test interviews. Overall, 77 persons were interviewed (20 Wu, 25 LN, 25 Wm and 7 L!, see Figure 1 ). The seven lighthouse vintners (L!) are vintners with outstanding biodiversity supporting vineyard management and economic success (being an ecological ideal for the other vintners, economic success is indispensable). The lighthouse vintners were selected by the ecological specialists of our research team, who had accompanied them in their ecological efforts for years. Six of the lighthouse vintners were organic farmers.
Descriptive and analytic statistics
Statistical data were analysed by generalized linear models (GLM) with a binomial error distribution to test if different farm characteristics like the management form (organic, conventional, integrated), the farm size, the age of vintners, full-or part-time farming or the region would influence herbicide use, opting out of ÖPUL or the participation in ÖPUL. Explanatory variables that improved the model quality were also tested with a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis-test. Statistical analyses were computed in R 3.4.1 (R Development Core Team 2017).
Qualitative interviews
Interviews (consecutively numbered from I 1 to I 77) were recorded in writing and on audio-tape, the open questions were partly transcribed, coded and saved in an Access database. The semi-structured interviews -with open and closed answers -were divided in five sections (a) organization of the vineyard, b) management and attitude of the vintners towards ÖPUL and nature-friendly viticulture, c) information on the surveyed vineyards, d) attitude of the vintners towards biodiversity, e) information on the interviewed vintner) including overall 69 questions. The interview length varied depending on the vintners' willingness to provide information (up to 3 hours, in average 1 ½ hours).
A qualitative content analysis looked into motivation crowding effects based on deductive coding (Table 1 and Table 2 ) and inductive codes directly derived from the interview transcripts. In the results section, single, particularly representative and meaningful quotes are used to illustrate the results. They are cited with a reference to the relevant study site (Wu, Wm or LN) and the management style (organic, conventional, IP) and were translated for this article into The statistical data analysis (GLM) showed that the use of herbicides was best explained by the management form (organic, conventional, integrated) and the region where the farm belonged to. In the Wagram region, more than 60%, whereas in Leithaberg-Neusiedlersee only 35% of all wine growers used herbicides in their vineyards (see Table 3 ). Other explanatory variables did not improve the model fit. The ÖPUL dropout was only significantly influenced by the management form (best GLM model and significant Kruskal-Wallis test) -no organic farmers are among the drop-outs.
The participation in ÖPUL was also most influenced by the management form and also by the farm size, where larger farms were more likely to participate in ÖPUL than smaller ones. It was not possible to establish any GLM that would explain factors which influence the decision for maintaining measures for combatting soil erosion outside of ÖPUL.
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Tab 3. Herbicide application by management form (n=75; two interviewees in LN were not included due to missing data) and for ÖPUL dropouts (n=9; 5 do not use herbicides).
Results from the qualitative interviews
Crowding-out mechanisms in the wine regions analysed
Based on the framework by Rode et al. (2015), we identified all crowding-out mechanisms (see Table 1 ) to also hold true for the Austrian ÖPUL implementation (erosion control, organic farming, IP, and high value areas) in vineyards. In addition, we identified some specific challenges for smaller and less specialised or part-time farmers regarding the administrative burden of ÖPUL participation.
One of the main critic on ÖPUL phrased by about one third of the interviewees is the perceived administrative burden linked to control aversion and frustration. The case study also found connections between some farmers' ambiguous relationship with the monitoring executive agency and reduced internal satisfaction and image motivation. Some vintners expressed their regret that the high workload of small-scale farmers or in difficult locations (for example vineyard terraces) lacks appreciation and recognition, which is crucial to develop intrinsic internal satisfaction for the accomplished work and services: "High work load, should be honoured. I work just as much as a 30 For some vintners ÖPUL represents a release from moral responsibility. They use the participation in ÖPUL as an excuse not to do more from an ecological point of view: "We already do anyhow more than required" (I 51, IP, LN) . If they follow all ÖPUL requirements, for example if they use the "right" pesticides from the "ÖPUL list", they cannot do anything "against" nature: "The [allowed] plant protection products are listed on an equivalent list and are tested for environmental compatibility" (I 28, IP, LN) , "There is a pre-sorting [through the equivalent list], the aggressive sprays are sorted out. So the beneficial organisms will not be completely destroyed" (I 2, IP, Wm). In some cases, IP participation was used as a legitimation for herbicide application. Some farmers (mainly organic but also conventional vintners) were very eager in using species-rich seed mixes, while others perceived that they conscientiously fulfilled their "duty" by using at least one hardy species, as required for erosion control since 2014. And vintners with terraces, as terraces per se count as erosion control, did not see any objectives in removing the vegetation cover in the hot/dry season or to green just every second row.
Whereas vintners did not directly address frame shifting for themselves, they indirectly referred to change of values in mind-sets more generally: "Money persuades them all. Every farmer who gets something as a gift will take the money and do what they ask him to do, even if it's dull" (I 10, conventional, Wm). And they pointed out that the shifted mind-set might be a problem, for the long-term fulfilment of ecological measures in the case of ÖPUL being terminated: "The disadvantage of subsidies is [the fact], that you get used to it and it will become hard to do it without them" (I 14, organic, Wm). To understand long-term changes of social-psychological patterns, the data does not provide enough insights. Longitudinal research covering several decades of ÖPUL implementation will be more insightful in the future, hopefully. However, some vintners seriously doubt that financial incentives are a promising way for the delivery of ecological services in the long-run: "The financial incentive is not the right way in a long-term perspective" (L! 73, organic, Wm).
Summarizing, one can say that ÖPUL, in combination with several other policies and adjacent funding schemes, contributes to farmers' income and thus to viable farms that are needed for maintaining important agro-ecosystems such as small-scale and/or terraced vineyards. Interviewees rather question the sufficiency based on the huge administrative burden than on the compensation of extra work or profit forgone when providing the environmental service. Due to economies of scale, smaller farmers or farmers with less administrative capacity are particularly affected by these mostly fixed transaction costs. Several of the interviewees questioned the effectiveness and practicability of the interventions prescribed to pursue the ecological goals, even if most of the vintners agree with the ecological goals per se. Payments decrease vintners' vulnerabilities towards variable quantity and quality of harvests or changes in consumer demand. However, this additional "income" might create new dependencies and have unintended risk-related side effects, such as psychological pressure of being controlled for mistakes in the documentation or timing of management operations as well as lost autonomy and flexibility. Thus, short-term risk reduction can create new medium-or long-term risks. Farmers questioning the effectiveness of the measures, but generally agreeing with the conservation objectives, are in line with cautioning warning by van Hecken et al. (2017) against central administered policies reflecting an overly simplistic notion of human nature relationships as manageable systems, which can be altered in predictable ways.
Crowding-in mechanisms in the wine regions analysed
The research illustrates that about one third of ÖPUL participating and non-participating vintners endorse the importance and value of the ÖPUL programme for its contribution to the environmental quality and impulse as an initial learning process. The positive perception of the value and beauty of nature and environmental quality are mentioned in the interviews as important stimuli to develop an enhanced internal satisfaction: "I want a beautiful vineyard - Since we know that it is so rare, we do not cut it -on purpose" (I 55, IP, Wu) and another vintner, who had cut the rare European birthwort against the wish of his wife in preceding years, envisaged to let it grow in the future after the interview of this study (I 23, IP, Wm). Some vintners recognise that "strangers" see and appreciate things that seem normal/not special for them. For their professional work, they would appreciate a stronger societal recognition: "The important thing would be the recognition for his area. Telling him [the vintner] that his vineyard is nice" (I 7, organic, Wm). Although the bureaucratic effort (including mandatory management documentation) was criticized by more than one third of the interviewed ÖPUL participants, some vintners also perceived the documentation as a good way of learning and capacity building. The documentation, which they would not have compiled without ÖPUL offers them the opportunity to trace back and check, which steps and cultivation measures were applied the years before: " [ Linked to intrinsic values and positive reinforcement, learning and capacity building was discussed in the interviews as well as in the follow-up workshop by the vintners as important pillar and requirement for successful ÖPUL measures. In the ÖPUL programme, learning is anchored by mandatory training and professional education. On the one hand, the case study indicates possible linkages between intrinsic motivation, a positive perception of learning and the policy design of the ÖPUL scheme: "In my opinion the subsidy schemes should focus on knowledge generation. First awareness raising, providing information -which has to be collected -then, accompanying consultancy during the programme period and remuneration at the end" (I 58, conventional, Non-ÖPUL, Wu). On the other hand, we also see that vintners link learning with the reinforcement of attitude regarding service delivery: "The more you do, the more you should be rewarded" (I 21, IP, Wm). Some vintners also speculated regarding result-oriented policy schemes: "The subsidy could even be higher the more flora and fauna you have in your 368/xx vineyard" (I 50, organic conversion farm, LN) . However, another interviewee, asked about his opinion of result-based agri-environmental schemes, questioned the long-term learning effect of result-based payments: "Five euros for each grass-lilly. That wouldn´t be sustainable, since the vintner would just start to count the grass-lillys even though he is not interested at all" (I 7, organic, Wm). In a result-based scheme, not the practises for environmental quality would be the basis for the subsidy but the actual result or the environmental condition of the vineyard. With this scheme paying for results and not for the implementation of prescribed practices, the current control of dates and management activities, which some vintners even consider as ineffective, would be obsolete. However, a shift to a result-based compensation design would even ask for more baseline surveys and constant monitoring activities to control the improvement of the environmental condition. Providing this information might be difficult, as the Austrian Court of Audit (RH, 2013 (RH, , 2016 ) has repeatedly and without much success demanded evidence on the effectiveness of the present policy design, to verify the effective use of tax money for the policy aim of improving environmental quality. Some intrinsically motivated vintners wish that ÖPUL requirements are compulsory for all vintners. Thus, motivated vintners feel more encouraged in their doing as they would be, when confronted with bad examples of their colleagues: "General abolition, general ban on green spraying. Understock injection is a deadly product!" (I 45, conventional, Non-ÖPUL, LN). Therefore, they consider controls as important: "There is a lot of misuse…" (I 24, IP, Wm).
Regarding the long-term effect towards changed perceptions, values and norms for a more environmentally friendly viticulture, we found two different perceptions. Some vintners reported that ÖPUL has been a stimulus for them to practice more Table 3 ). The majority of ÖPUL-vintners (56 from 77) underlined that in case of a programme stop, they would continue with parts of the measures even without funding (only two reported, that after a funding stop, they would also stop the ÖPUL measures). But, there have also been observations that the "positive" effects of ÖPUL disappear in the very moment when the programme terminates. In general, it is difficult to understand how comparatively "short-term" and/or changing ÖPUL measures affect social systems and socio-psychological patterns such as norms, values or worldviews of farmers and rural communities in the long-run (Fisher, 2012; Frey, 1992 ; Rico García-Amado et al., 2013). However, there are several indications that there have been learning processes on greening, erosion control and in some cases also herbicide use in the study sites. Therefore, some vintners reported that in the past, the vineyards were "brown", i.e. the vineyard management has changed from open surface management to one that facilitates vegetation. "Strict management is over." (I 10, conventional, Wm).
These learning processes are positively reinforced by best practice of neighbours and leading farmers (for example the economic successful organic vintners) and peer recognition and maybe even long-term value change towards more sensitivity and responsibility towards nature embedded in mechanisms that are linked to identity and self-efficacy and internal satisfaction with farming (van Dijk et al., 2016). Thus, it seems that in some cases, payments have actually provided a spur for changing perspectives and rationalities, and resulted in a broader structural change (van Hecken et al., 2017)
Concluding remarks
Our results of the 77 interviews show that the framework of Rode et al. (2015) is applicable to understand motivation crowding of agri-environmental schemes targeted at vineyards. Additionally, we detected also specific challenges for smaller and less specialised or part-time farmers regarding the administrative burden of ÖPUL participation. The research suggests that vintners are motivated not only by financial incentives but by a complex combination of different socio-psychological mechanisms that are intersecting and contingent -either reinforcing, aggravating or hindering the delivery of environmental services. In order to address environmental quality and ecological risks in an effective policy design, it is crucial to grasp different combinations of mechanisms for motivation crowding. In our case study sites, we identified three types of vintners based on different crowding-in and crowding-out mechanisms:
(1) The first group is not willing to participate in the AES because of the administrative burden, control aversion and the desire for autonomy. Due to economies of scale, smaller farmers and less specialised farmers are confronted with comparable higher share of transaction costs. Some farmers of this group doubt the effectiveness of the measures, but most of them agree with the ecological goals per se.
(2) The second group flexibly reacts to financial incentives and appears to be susceptible to the risk of short-term frame shifting. Payments from AES are a welcome short-term additional income, more or less independently from the outline of the scheme. Therefore, they would rather stop the measure in the very moment the payments are terminated or lowered beyond a critical level.
3) The third group of participating vintners showed indications of changed perceptions, rationalities, values and norms for a more environmentally-friendly viticulture. A short-term economic motivation was followed by a long-term change in ecological motivation that was nurtured for example, through social learning, peer recognition, experience and good examples.
Agri-environmental schemes in viticulture that allow for more experimentation with context-and farm-specific approaches could result in more diversity, better ecological outcomes and finally in less ecological risks. As ÖPUL clearly cannot reach the first group of vintners, more research is needed to better understand how different strategies of risk governance, such as legal standards, 370/xx information, capacity building, incentives and reflective discourse might be best to motivate vintners for environmentally-friendly viticulture. For example, the lighthouse vintners -who are not only ecologically but also economically successful -might serve as best practice examples and become important allies in an integrated governance strategy. Scoping studies that are assessing different motivational mechanisms prior to design and rollout of AES might be beneficial to design well-functioning policies that depend on the willingness and ability of diverse vintners to be implemented. Designing AES to improve environmental quality and to reduce environmental risks might be dysfunctional if designed as stand-alone schemes; rather they should be embedded in a broader risk governance approach that addresses different groups with diverging motivations.
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